THE ART OF QUESTIONING AND THE HEROISM OF MR. TRUMP

The figure of the heroic and decisive leader persists in the media and in the vulgate of political commentary, and also in some historical studies.  Every dictator or dictator’s pigeon is intoxicated with this theory. This is the case of Mr. Trump. He is at the head of an incipient dictatorship. Something very important is at stake, but the game has only just begun. Mr. Trump’s heroism may end up on the ground. In this article I propose some questions about the case.

I want to cite a theory that was very much in vogue in the first half of the 19th century.  Think of Hegel’s famous description of Napoleon: “It is the spirit of the world on horseback.” Hegel seems to have been able to contemplate the triumphant commander of the French forces at the Battle of Jena, while finishing one of his great treatises on philosophy (The Phenomenology of Spirit) in 1807. In that same period (1802-1803) Beethoven composed his third symphony, nicknamed “the heroic” in honor of Napoleon. He would later regret dedicating it to Bonaparte in particular and dedicated it to heroism in general.

The prestige and diffusion of this view of history is attributed to the work of Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881), the essayist and philosopher from Edinburgh.  In his time Scotland produced many thinkers in the field of political economy and the social sciences, whose prestige was great in the Victorian era and whose influence extends to the present day. 

Carlyle introduced German idealism to the United Kingdom, with an emphasis on heroic leadership in history.  This current of German thought had protagonists such as Hegel, Nietzsche, and Spengler.  Its reputation—particularly the mixture of spiritualism and authoritarianism—declined in the second half of the 19th century.  Two important thinkers of the time subjected it to ruthless criticism: Karl Marx in the German sphere, and Herbert Spencer in the English sphere.  Although very different, both are considered precursors of modern sociology.

 Since then, the intellectual consensus has coalesced around the basic idea that the engines of history are impersonal and collective forces, and not the initiatives of exceptional leaders.  We can cite some of these forces: economic development, demography, class conflicts, geopolitics.

However, the figure of the heroic and decisive leader persists in the media and in the vulgate of political commentary, and also in some historical studies.  Every dictator or dictator’s pigeon is intoxicated with this theory. This is the case of Mr. Trump. Having reached the peak of power, he feels like a hero. Your case raises three questions for me.

There has always been a tension between the anonymity of the great variables of structure, on the one hand, and the apparently decisive intervention of individual leadership, or the will of a few, on the other. 

First question: How to combine two visions (voluntarist or deterministic) of human action? What is the context of “heroic” leadership?

Reviewing the literature in the social sciences, I find several options to answer this question.  First of all, I reiterate the famous phrase: “people make history, but in circumstances that are not of their choosing.” All gross voluntarism is thus eliminated, but not the conditions that elevate a dictator to power.

•  When the struggle between classes, groups, or parties is stuck in an impasse of mutual vetoes, circumstances are conducive to authoritarian arbitration. Classic and modern examples abound. The most famous is the usurpation of power by Julius Caesar, when at the end of the Roman Republic, the civil war between factions caused this military man to carry out a successful coup.  Despite his subsequent assassination, there was no turning back and the Empire was established, where all power was concentrated in one person. This type of political evolution, applied to other similar historical circumstances, is called Caesarism.
• When an old political regime becomes weak and decadent, and faces an insurrection accompanied by a popular and massive mobilization in its favor (more than 35% of the population), it tends to collapse.  The opportunity is then created for the seizure of power by revolutionary leaders, either immediately or over a longer period.  Lenin, Mao, and Castro are the best-known examples. They went from being adventurers to being heroes. The contemporary novelty is that the current regime is democratic and the revolution is reactionary. We are in an upside-down world.
• When the old regime is subjected to drastic and authoritarian reform in the hands of a “savior.” This case has sometimes been referred to as “authoritarian reintegration.”[1]  In Argentina, General Rosas was a “restorer.” A later example was the eruption of a dictatorship by a military junta (1976-1982). It also happened a little earlier in Greece, and it is quite common in Latin America. 

A variant is the less sudden erosion of a democratic regime and its transition to an authoritarian one without a military coup.  This variant is more common today, and bears the label of “illiberal democracy.”[2]  Some examples are Hungary, Turkey, maybe the US, and the contagion will not stop there.

Second question: From the Romans we have inherited this question: Quis custodet ipsos custodes? (Who guards the guardians?). Or if you prefer: Who saves us from some heroes?

 In other words, if power is concentrated in an all-powerful subject, what guarantees do people have to protect themselves in case the “great man” is a cruel tyrant[3], an incapable, or a madman? To avoid such misfortunes, the most perceptive thinkers proposed a series of institutional safeguards, such as the division of powers and periodic elections, all of them within a basic document, that is, a constitution. It is the cornerstone of modern democratic constitutionalism. It is not only a political proposal but also an advance of civilization.

For democratic and republican constitutionalism to work, certain requirements and social bases of support are required: sustained economic development, not excessive popular mobilization, and a civic culture with a high level of education. When these enter into crisis, a more or less generalized expectation arises for those in power to take emergency measures.  This is how we go from a normal republican state to a state of exception. To quote Max Weber, the justification of power changes from a legal/rational legitimation to a charismatic one.

In the United States, the aforementioned support foundations have been cracking in recent decades. On the economic level, extreme inequality has prevented the fruits of growth from reaching several lower strata of the social structure.  At the level of political representation, and related to the above, there has been a great polarization.  On the map

civic culture and rational capacity have been eroded[4].

Third question: How do authoritarian regimes end? What is the twilight of the gods like?

If we go back in Western history, we will naturally find the half millennium of the Roman Empire in our era.  We know that the political regime of Rome passed from republic to empire after the military coup and the subsequent dictatorship of Julius Caesar. With the extreme concentration of power arose the problem of replacing the ruler, which Rome could not solve.  Of the 70 or 77 emperors (depending on how one counts), 37 were assassinated, that is, more than 50%, which indicates great instability and eventually a degradation of the regime. The lesson is that tyrannicide is not a satisfactory way to moderate or replace authoritarian rule.

In the modern era, that is, the era of the nation-state, the state began as strongly authoritarian. With the passage of time, it went from an absolute monarchy to a limited monarchy, generally under a constitution and with a counterweight of powers, from the parliamentary to the judicial.  Eventually and gradually, the regime opened up to popular participation.  Today we recognize it as a republican democracy.  This development did not occur without setbacks, and had authoritarian interruptions (dictatorships).

Much has been written about the illness and death of democracies, but less about the dynamics and end of the authoritarian regimes that succeed them[5].  Because, as the saying goes, there is no evil that lasts a hundred years.

Ways in which dictatorships end, with special reference to the new authoritarian regime in the US.  Sunset Examples and Comparisons.

Historical cases suggest the following typology:

• Coup d’état: A sector of the regime itself, usually military, overthrows the dictator, as happened in Venezuela with Marcos Pérez Jiménez, and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina.  In the case of the United States, this scenario must be ruled out in the medium term, because it is extreme and for now of low probability.
• Social pressure and strikes: Mass mobilizations, general strikes, and strategic actions that affect the economic interests of the regime can weaken it.
• Plebiscites and elections: In some cases, internal and external pressure forces authoritarian rulers to call plebiscites or elections, as happened with Augusto Pinochet in Chile, where he lost a plebiscite and the democratic transition began. In the US there is still a possibility of an electoral defeat for the Trump regime.
• Death or old age of the dictator: Sometimes, the dictatorship ends with the death of the leader, as in the case of Francisco Franco in Spain, which opens the door to a transition.  In the case of Mr. Trump, no matter how heroic he pretends, biology will have the last word.
• Internal division and loss of support: Infighting among regime elites or loss of support from the military can precipitate the end of the dictatorship. These divisions will increase in the near future within the United States. The new American oligarchy is not a compact power elite.
• Foreign intervention: Sometimes, international pressure or intervention contributes to the fall of the regime. China’s considerable economic-military pressure will be a major factor in the years ahead. The pressure from other blocs, such as the European bloc, will have less weight.
• Popular revolution: When the opposition manages to unify forces and mobilize the population, a revolution can take place that overthrows the dictator. This is very unlikely to happen in the United States. The population is profoundly reactionary.
• Defeat in a war: this is the case of the Greek military junta after the failure of a war in Cyprus (1974), and of the Argentine dictatorship after its defeat in the Falklands War (1982). In the 19th century, the main case is the fall of Napoleon III after his defeat at Sedan (1870). The Second World War is the most catastrophic version of this scenario with the military defeat of the fascist powers. Given the history of wars not finished or lost by the US at the height of its power (from the Korean War onwards) this may become a decisive factor in future wars and in full decline as a superpower.

The determining factors of the success or failure of the fall of a dictatorship or a sui generis authoritarian regime such as the one that is taking shape in the United States are the following:

• Weakening of the regime’s economic pillars: A crisis in the regime’s sources of financing and economic support is usually more effective thanmass demonstrations. In the case of the US, it may happen with the sustained and severe fall of its Treasury bonds if tariff chaos or other destructive policies that undermine the “exorbitant privilege” of the dollar continues. In the United Kingdom, the case of Prime Minister Liz Truss is sobering.[6]
• Unity and organization of the opposition: Coordination and strategic planning are key to taking advantage of the weaknesses of the authoritarian regime. Otherwise, in cases such as Trump in the US and Milei in Argentina, the fragmentation and disorganization of the opposition contribute to their maintenance in power.
• The role of the military: Dictatorship depends on the loyalty of the armed forces; if they stop supporting the regime, the fall is imminent. The Trump regime’s irresponsible and untimely purge of military commanders may undermine the loyalty of the military.
• Planned transition: It is essential to have a plan for the democratic transition, since the power vacuum can be exploited by non-democratic forces even after a dictatorship.

In short, dictatorships and authoritarian regimes in general They usually end up due to a combination of social pressure, loss of military support, internal crises, strategic actions that affect their economic interests and, sometimes, due to the death of the dictator or international intervention. The restoration of democracy requires a well-planned transition to avoid setbacks.

 Something very important is at stake these days, but the game has only just begun. Mr. Trump’s heroism, like the superiority of Humpty Dumpty, may end up on the ground. Although the misgovernment of the current administration is short-lived, the damage has already been done and it is not clear that what comes next will be better.

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1.Barrington Moore, Jr., Political Power and Social Theory: Seven Studies, New York: Harper Torch books, 1965.

[2]   The rulers of an illiberal democracy ignore or circumvent the constitutional limits of their power. They also tend to ignore the will of the minority, which is what makes democracy illiberal. Elections in an illiberal democracy are often rigged or rigged, and are used to legitimize and consolidate the incumbent rather than elect the country’s leaders and policies. They promote confusion and fear in the citizenry. They attack independent organizations and seek to subject them to government policies.

[3] From a political point of view, cruelty means the intentional promotion, from a position of power, of unnecessary human suffering.

[4] See in this regard an important essay by David Brooks on the combination of concentrated power and mental incompetence and its antecedents: https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/10/opinion/education-smart-thinking-reading-tariffs.html

[5] Steven Levitzky and Daniel Ziblatt, How Democracies Die.  New York: Broadway books, 2018.  To reflect on the dynamics of authoritarianism, I recommend starting with Franz Neuman, “Notes towards a theory of dictatorship,” in The Democratic and the Authoritarian State, New York: Glencoe, 1957.

[6] His troubles began three weeks after he took office with a disastrous “mini-budget” presented by his finance minister.

In it, he proposed broad tax cuts that caused turbulence in the markets and the precipitous fall in the value of the pound sterling.  More blows followed when the new finance minister revoked almost all of Truss’s tax proposals. The announcement was one of the most dramatic changes in modern British political history and was a huge humiliation for Truss’s leadership and led to her downfall.

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