Opinion Sur
Major geopolitical changes (in human time), just as tectonic changes (in geological time) are first prepared slowly and then burst with force in a short time. We can make an extension of the usual meaning proper to the field of geology that is produced by movements of the earth’s crust and apply it to the study of inter-state politics.
Structural movements of the earth’s plates cause deep, radical, very strong changes. This same sense has been extended to political language in phrases such as “The direct aggression of one country against another, such as the Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by the American distancing of Ukraine with Trump and its rapprochement with Russia have provoked terrible, tectonic changes;” as well as in other areas the changes provoked by the digital world – especially artificial intelligence – affect all sectors of the economy and society.
The geopolitical landscape of the 21st century contains four alternatives: (1) new American hegemony; (2) Chinese hegemony; (3) condominium; (4) war. I add each of them has variants and presents options. I will concentrate on the first.
The first alternative is the easiest to appreciate, because the United States exercised hegemony for some 80 years, from the end of World War II to the present day. Today that model of hegemony or “world architecture” is partly broken by the consequences of its own success. They fostered a global growth that empowered other beneficiaries, and these became rivals in power and wealth. Today the US is in full retreat as a hegemonic power, — not in all dimensions, but in two fundamental pillars of its former dominance: its alliances and its values.
In the previous hegemonic model, alliances were generally both extensive and solid. They comprised major countries on several continents, from Europe to Asia and Oceania, via the neighborhood in their own hemisphere. This set was called by various names – ‘free world,’ ‘West,’ ‘first world,’ etc., successfully confronted by its Soviet rival. The allied countries generally enjoyed an elective affinity in their political and social systems, namely liberal democracy and social reformism. In the developed world the rival socialist countries – sometimes referred to as the ‘second world,’ were on the defensive. Only in the so-called ‘third world’ (dependent or developing countries) did they maintain an offensive attitude, with their support for various revolutions and liberation movements, because there American hegemony was more brutal and despotic. Following a distinguished political scientist of that era, we can qualify that order with the label ‘predatory democracy.’[1] The war in Vietnam was emblematic in this regard. Its outcome was a foretaste of a later retreat in other terrains.
With that international retreat coupled with a reactionary domestic involution, the US went from being a predatory democracy to a predatory autocracy. The schizoid structure of the first system -democracy and prosperity at home; propaganda and exploitation in the underdeveloped world with the destruction of democracies in the name of security- is being replaced by an amalgam of internal authoritarianism and external predation. It is not a schizoid complex but a strange overbearing autism (autarchy plus theft).
The strategic problem for the US in this transition is the indistinction between a hard stance of unchecked power, reminiscent of the interaction between powers in the 19th and mid-20th century (sometimes referred to as a balance of power between strong states), and a disruptive and capricious stance, with no long-term plan, and at the mercy of an impulsive autocrat. The latter posture exacerbates the anarchy inherent in a system of states lacking a higher order. The net result is a greater likelihood of war. Worse, weapons of mass destruction (nuclear and cyber) lose deterrent capability directly proportional to their proliferation
In other words, there is a struggle between a classic strategic realism with the abandonment of the expansionist liberalism of previous decades, on the one hand, and an overbearing isolationism towards old allies and transactions with new rivals, on the other hand. On the external front (relations between states), the first half of the equation is correct; the second half is disastrous.
On the domestic front, there is a strong tendency towards authoritarianism – the so-called “illiberal democracy.” In the United States, we observe a voluntary and unconditional surrender or submission of republican institutions similar to other historical examples. A good analysis of this process can be found in the research work of sociologist Ivan Ermakoff of the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ermakoff’s theory, explored in his book Ruling Oneself Out: A Theory of Collective Abdications,[2] analyzes abdication as a result of a process of collective alignment, especially in times of crisis and uncertainty, using an interdisciplinary methodology.
Ermakoff focuses on paradigmatic cases of voluntary and unconditional abdication, such as the passage of the notorious Gesetz zur Behegung der Not von Volk und Reich (Law for the Remedy of the Needs of the People and the Reich, or super law of necessity and urgency, of 1933) which allowed Hitler to change the constitution without parliamentary supervision, and the transfer of powers to Pétain in Vichy, France, in 1940.
Conventional explanations attribute these actions to coercive pressures, miscalculations or ideological contamination. Ermakoff argues that these explanations are incomplete or misleading. Ermakoff reinterprets abdication as the result of a collective alignment process, highlighting the mechanisms of alignment in difficult times and the importance of actors’ beliefs, perceptions and subjective states.
His theory can explain the rise to power of characters like Trump in the US and Milei in Argentina. The problem with these characters is that they have so far failed to consolidate the collective alignment that brought them to power. In my opinion, this is an important difference with the dictatorships of the 20th century. It rather resembles the description of the situation in the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the late 19th century. A politician of the time (Victor Adler) is credited with the expression “Autoritarismus gemildert durch Schlamperei,” which we can translate as “Authoritarianism moderated by dullness.” In the administrations (sic) of Trump and Milei, as the Argentine historian and journalist Carlos Pagni points out, clumsiness has become more than a defect an ideology, proclaimed by leaders of anti-politics.
It is not my purpose in this article to analyze the internal process of collective alignment in the face of the executive’s rudeness in the U.S. administration. I will concentrate on the results of its performance in the “unleashed bull” mode in the field of international relations.
The shift from a predatory liberal democracy to a demolishing autocracy will with some probability produce the following geopolitical outcomes, both desired and undesired. It is left to the reader to take stock of both.
With the 180-degree turn in the U.S. relationship with historical allies, the main effects (relatively positive for the West) would be:
- Revealing effect of European weakness. Sincerity.
- Possible reinforcement of European unity in the face of its strategic lack of protection.
- Rearmament of the main power in the European Union (Germany) and coordination with the two nuclear powers in Europe.
- UK’s strategic approach to the EU post-Brexit.
- Relative rapprochement between the US and Russia, leaving the hands free for the US to focus its strategy of containing China.
Negative or undesirable effects:
- Possible nuclear proliferation in Europe (Poland, Germany)
- Failure (due to imperfection) in the attempt to “pull the plug” on the Russia-China alliance.
- Breakdown of trust and US strategic coordination
with Europe. End of NATO.
- Increased European anti-Americanism from both the left and the right.
- Continued European fragmentation with abandonment of a central geopolitical role
- Europe’s transition from a world power to a museum continent.
- Change in the identity of the West.
- China’s continued and patient geo-strategic advance.
The latter is the key point and will be the subject of further reflection
For the moment I dare say that the geopolitical gains of the US in the short term assure its strategic decline in the long term. One hypothesis that we can consider for the future is that the ideology and practice of clumsiness on the part of anti-political leaders, if they manage to impose themselves in complex societies, will lead to a localist fragmentation (as happened in the Middle Ages), with this novelty: the geopolitical whole will be (badly) coordinated by networks and artificial intelligence.[3]
[1] Barrington Moore, Jr., Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery, Boston: Beacon Press, 1972.
[2] Published by Duke University Press, 2008.
[3] See Yanis Varoufakis, Techno feudalism, New York: Melville Press, 2025.
If you liked this text, you can subscribe by filling out the form that appears on this page to receive once a month a brief summary of the English Edition of Opinion Sur
