How to mortgage the future, or the second Deutches Requiem

Germany, a key country in Europe, is stubbornly supporting negative and technocratic policies facing a crisis that is no longer economic but also a social and political catastrophe. A major shift is needed to avoid either a gradual or a sudden disintegration of the continent.

How to mortgage the future, or the second Deutches Requiem [1]

In memory of Ulrich Beck (1944-2015)

At the end of his second seven-year term as president of France, François Mitterrand left office with words similar to those used by his monarchic predecessor Louis XV. He did not say, as that king, “Après moi, le déluge” (“after me, the deluge”), but he dared say “Après moi il n’y aura plus que des financiers et des comptables” (“after me, there will only be financiers and accountants”). As one of the founding fathers—together with Helmut Kohl—of the Euro and the consolidation of the European Union, Mitterrand was aware of the dangers that could stalk the Union. In the absence of a statesman’s courage, of solidarity, and of geopolitical clarity, the association of European countries and peoples would remain in the hands of bankers, accountants, and technocrats. With these eminent rule drafters (mostly of negative rules) whose vision of risk is mainly that of a payment due date, the great project of a strong Europe in the world, a beacon of civilization, with high living standards and a vibrant market, might slowly disintegrate. In its place, there would be an unhitched group of uneven nations, with diverse policies and just one common denominator: pusillanimity.

Such destiny does not interest the United States of Obama, but it does matter to the Russian Federation of Vladimir Putin, and may be because of the old tradition of “perfidious Albion”, to certain British elites as well. All other actors in the global geopolitical board could care less, except to take advantage of the situation with opportunistic bites. If that scenario were to be fulfilled, it would remain only one strong and ordered country within the European group: Germany. But this European power would have lost the opportunity to lead—with forward-looking vision, solidarity, and concessions towards their lagging partners—a more optimistic and hopeful Europe. For Germany, this has been and is still the best option. If it does not realize and wake up in time, it will be trapped in the following dilemma: it will be too big a nation for Europe but too small for the world. The old continent will witness a second Deutsches Requiem, with Germany tied to the oscillations of three bigger powers in dispute: the United States, Russia, and China.

Why does Germany abdicate—together with other European governments— a leadership worthy of a great destiny? The causes are several. Some are remote and others are immediate. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the German nation (still not unified) did not participate in any successful democratic revolution, but it joined every counterrevolution. When it was unified under Prussian rule, its industrialization and modernization were top-down processes and strongly authoritarian . “Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Soldaten” (“Only soldiers help to face the democratic forces”) is a German aphorism that the Prussian king loved to cite and was originally formulated by writer Wilhelm von Merckel against 1948 Frankfurt liberals.

In the twentieth century, first German authoritarianism and then its brand of totalitarianism dominated the European continent, produced the Holocaust under Nazism, and immersed the world in two wars that claimed one hundred million dead. During the postwar, Germany was occupied and divided into two systems, and forced to incorporate to them. Since 1989, a new unified Germany transformed itself into the strongest economy in Europe, carried out neoliberal reforms, and joined France as its main political partner in the project of the European Union. With the commendable willingness to definitely leave behind the dark legacy of authoritarianism and militarism appeared an understandable German reticence to assume political and cultural leadership appropriate to its new economic power. The new Germany would have preferred to be a larger Switzerland in some lost corner of the world.

With regards to security, Germany took refuge in the US military prowess in NATO and, in terms of geopolitical leadership, chose to being guided by the US as leader of the West during the Cold War. When the latter ended, and the project of a European commercial and monetary union was already in progress, Germany ended up in front of the continent in a position for which it was not prepared and with which it felt uncomfortable. Germany chose compromise and disguise and benefitted from them until the global capitalist crisis broke out in 2008.

Germany was the main lender to other European countries in a decade of financial expansion and speculation. It benefitted from a European market for German exports but lubricated by a debt which was seen by many as unsustainable. Europe was the new and flimsy German economic Lebensraum. [2] When in the financial casino of late capitalism the inevitable “No more bets” arrived, Germany harshly and systematically persisted in a double policy: to save the lending banks and impose austerity on the peoples of debtor countries. Today the German motet would be “Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Technokraten” (“Only the technocrats can help against the democrats”).

German “leadership” went from speculative to repressive and the Euro—the monetary expression of the European Union—transformed itself from lubricant to a straight-jacket for countries such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal where artificial prosperity had concealed the lack of reforms and a more viable model of development. As main manager of the new austerity, Germany hid behind multilateral organisms and the Brussels bureaucracy, while the crisis that spread through the continent changed from being economic to social and ended up as a political mess.

Faced with this acute crisis—that though it started in the peripheral countries of Europe soon reached Italy and France— the German answer has been pro-cyclical and counterproductive in economic terms, regressive and alienating in social matters, and polarizing in right and left-wing parties regarding politics. The historic verdict seems harsh today: Europe is dominated by a strong, reluctant, and negative country that, in pursuit of a limited and utopian economic “solution,” is leading the continent into a social and political crisis. In the absence of a positive and wider view, it drives the rest of Europe towards xenophobic, nationalist, and extremist experiments. Europe’s critical juncture goes far beyond the issue of the Greek debt. I will explain it in future articles. As a preview and summary, I present two photographs and two captions that seem appropriate: one from the nineteenth century applied to a brainy German civil servant and another one,from Argentina from the twentieth century that can be applied to a wily Greek politician.

Wolfgang Schaeuble, German Finance Minister, lawyer and expert in taxes.“Gegen Demokraten helfen nur Technokraten”  [3] “Only the technocrats can help against the democrats”

Yanis Varoufakis. Greek Finance Minister, economist, expert in game theory that defines himself as an occasional Marxist. “Los dirigentes a la cabeza del pueblo o el pueblo con la cabeza de los dirigentes.” “With the leaders ahead of the people or the people with the heads of their leaders.”