Opinion Sur
A hundred years after WWI, European leaders sleepwalk towards a total war. Like in 1914, they think that Ukraine war will be limited and of short durée.
In 1914, within the ministries it was believed that the war would last three weeks. There were four years and more than twenty million deaths. As in 1918, today prevails the opinion that it is necessary to punish the aggressor power in an exemplary way to leave it prostrated and humiliated over a long period of time. In 1918, the defeated power was Germany (as well as the Ottoman Empire). There were discordant voices (John Maynard Keynes and others) for whom total humiliation of Germany would have been disastrous for the reconstruction of Europe and a long-lasting peace in the continent and the world. They were not listened and twenty-one years later, Europe was once again at war. Five years of destruction and more than seventy million deaths followed. History does not repeat itself and apparently it does not teach anything, but it serves for illustrating and showing similarities and differences. Let us see some and the others in the light of two examples.
In 1914, Europe had lived in relative peace for a hundred years, with many wars but limited and of short durée. The secret of such peace was the Vienna Congress (1814-1815). This international meeting tried to put an end to the cycle of transformation, turbulence, and war that had started with the French Revolution and was aggravated with the Napoleon wars. The pact with which the Vienna Congress ended was signed nine days prior to the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. In such congress, conservative forces dominated and the period that followed was called Restauration (of the old European order). However, the Vienna Congress had another characteristic worth remembering now. It was presided by a great Austrian statesperson, Klemens von Metternich, whose main concern was to incorporate all European powers, both winners and losers, to guarantee a lasting peace. Of course, the losing power (France) had to suffer the consequences (territorial losses), but the pact was signed by it and the rest of the powers (Austria, England, Russia and Prussia) and with the conditions imposed to all to guarantee a lasting peace in Europe. As so it was done.
There are many differences in relation to our time. The main one is that this time, the war scenario is Europe, but the parts in conflict are a European power (Russia) and a non-European power (United States). This war has all the characteristics of a proxy war, a war in which the contenders take advantage of another one (Ukraine), the sacrifice country, to achieve geostrategic objectives that more than transcend those of such country and even those of the region in which it is integrated (Europe). Truly, Russia is at war with Ukraine because it is at war with NATO, an organization whose supreme commander allied in Europe is “traditionally an American commander[1].” An organization that, especially after the end of the first Cold War, has served the geostrategic interests of United States. Russia sacrifices illegally and brutally the principles of self-determination of the peoples, of which in previous geopolitical contexts was an important herald, to assert its security concerns after not seeing them recognized through pacific means and because of its undeniable imperial nostalgia. On the other side, since the end of the first Cold War, United States is committed to strengthen Russia’s defeat, a defeat that maybe was more self-inflicted than induced by the superiority of its adversary.
During a brief period, the diplomatique dispute in Washington was between the “association for peace” and “the expansion of NATO to guarantee the security of emerging countries from the Soviet bloc.” Ukraine war is subjected to the objective of inflicting an unconditional Russian defeat that, preferably, must last until it produces a regime change in Moscow. The war duration is subjected to such objective. If the British Prime Minister is allowed to say that sanctions against Russia will continue, no matter what Russia’s position is now, which will be the incentive for Russia to end the war? Afterall, is it enough that Putin be overthrown (as it happened to Napoleon in 1815) or is it Russia the one that has to be overthrown to stop China’s expansion? There was also a regime change in the1918 humiliated Germany, but its path would end in Hitler and in an even more devastating war. The political magnanimity of president Zelensky could built either as a courageous patriot that defends his country from the invader until the last drop of blood, or as the courageous patriot that faced with the danger of so much innocent death and asymmetry in military force, with the support of his allies, achieves a strong negotiation and a dignified peace. The fact that today the first construction prevails does not result from personal inclinations of president Zelensky.
A second example to see the similarities and differences with the recent past refers to the geopolitical position of Europe. During the two world wars of the XX century, Europe was the self-proclaimed center of the world. Thus, the wars involved the world. Nearly four million “European” troops, in reality were African and Asian, and many thousand non-European deaths were the sacrifice price to be inhabitants of colonies in faraway countries involved in wars that did not concern them. Today, Europe is a corner of the world and the Ukraine war will make it even smaller. For centuries, it was the extreme of Eurasia, that great land mass between China and Iberian Peninsula, through where knowledge, products, scientific and cultural innovations circulated. Much of what later was described as the European exceptionalism (from the scientific revolution of the XVI century until the industrial revolution of the XIX century) is not understood and would not have happened without such centuries-old circulation. Ukraine war, particularly if it is protracted, entails the risk of not only amputating one of Europe’s historical powers (Russia) but also isolating it from the rest of the world and, especially, from China. The world is far larger than what can be seen under European lenses. Seen through those lenses, Europeans never felt so strong, so united with its major partner, so confidently on the correct side of history, with the world of the “liberal order” dominating the planet and so sufficiently robust as to venture into conquering or, at least, neutralizing China, after destroying its main partner, Russia.
Seen with non-European lenses, Europe and United States are proudly almost alone, maybe able to win a battle, but certainly on the path to defeat in the war of history. More than half of the world’s population lives in countries that have decided not to impose sanctions against Russia. Many of those who voted (well) at UN against the illegal invasion of Ukraine, did so with justifications of their historical experience, which was not that of having been invaded by Russia, but rather by United States, England, France, Israel. Their decisions were not the results of their ignorance, but rather of their precaution. How can they trust countries that after having created a system for financial transfers (SWIFT) with the objective of defending the economic transactions from political influence, expel a country for political motives? In countries that claim for themselves the power to confiscate financial and gold reserves from sovereign countries such as Afghanistan, Venezuela, and now Russia? In countries that proclaim free speech as a sacrosanct universal value, but resort to censorship when they feel unveiled by it? In countries allegedly lovers of democracy that do not hesitate to produce coup d’états when the elected are not suited for their interests? In countries for which, according to the conveniences of the moment, the “dictator” Nicolas Maduro can suddenly become a commercial partner? The world has lost the innocence, if it ever had one.
Published at Other News
[1] . https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50110.htm
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