Opinion Sur
Our society is one of networks, whose effects, direct and indirect, driven by new information and communication technologies, stimulate a form of politics that is horizontal, soft, and egalitarian. This stands in contrast to the old idea of power based on conflict, on the distinction between friend and enemy, and on the imposition of a single will above all the rest. Politicians and officials who fail to understand this will be replaced sooner or later. The era of political surprises is upon us. The importance of forms and institutions
There is a saying in French that goes, “tout est dans la manière.” Form is sometimes as meaningful as content. Form is also an index of underlying attitudes and social structures. It was understand this way by one of the great essayists from sociology’s classic era – the German philosopher Georg Simmel.i Simmel’s sociology of conflict is based precisely on the premise that the form in which a conflict unfolds and is managed is equally important, if not more so, that the “underlying issue” at the root of the conflict. It is for this reason that, more than two centuries ago, the designers of the first modern democratic constitutions (including the founding fathers of the United States and our own Juan Bautista Alberdi) gave so much weight to the division of powers (the classic three-part separation between the executive, legislative and judicial branches). It is also for that reason that almost all political theories that followed those initial efforts emphasized the importance of certain institutions and certain political organizations (including modern political parties), owing to the fact that these mechanisms offered the means to coordinate and channel social conflicts. Formal democracy in its most basic form, i.e. the regular election of rulers by a voting public, does not in itself guarantee the happy resolution of conflicts. For that reason, a supplemental network of strong and independent institutions is necessary, as well as a respect for the law and an advanced civil culture.
Institutional “exposure” and its costs
In formal, participative and popular terms, Argentina has enjoyed democracy since 1983. This is an achievement, but it is not enough, as Argentina’s recurring crises and political instability during democratic times have shown. To keep things simple, I will say that the problem lies in the lack of modern parties, strong and independent institutions and a civil culture oriented toward negotiation and compromise rather than confrontation and censure. In the words of Argentina’s most important contemporary historian, I must sadly affirm that, in terms of institutions and parties, Argentina is “weathering in the open the harshest of storms.” (i)
Since the return of democracy, the party system has disintegrated. Its fragments fuse into alliances or fronts that serve for elections but lack foundations and fail to endure over time. The old radicalism has disappeared; the center-right parties fail to garner, even in the best of cases, more than 11 percent of the vote. The only surviving party, Peronism, is, as its own adherents concede, “more a feeling than a party.” It continues to receive from 42-46 percent of the vote, but it lacks coherence. For a long time now, the Peronists have imposed the interminable zigzags of their party on the rest of the country. The party has undergone every flip-flop possible between opposing political poles. It is impossible to conduct politics outside the party, but it is very difficult to do so within it. Those who lead it tend to concentrate power while the times are good, but do not manage well when circumstances change for the worse. The issue is a systemic one: the absence of balancing institutions drives social conflicts towards extra parliamentary routes, i.e. direct action on the streets. (iii)
Unresolved conflicts
The conflicts drag on, polarize and deepen. Worse still: they accumulate. Rather than being solved, each conflict is simply replaced by new ones. Quite simply, Argentina lacks the political “thermostat” of better-institutionalized countries, like the Western industrialized democracies and, in Latin America, adjacent countries like Chile and Uruguay. Its great tropical neighbor, Brazil, also has a weak party structure but makes up for this with a notable inclination among leaders, both in government and business, toward long-range politics and negotiated consensus on common objectives and values. Brazil exhibits moderation, flexibility, and consensus both in public and foreign policy. Its fundamental policies are constant, cumulative, silent and systematic. On the other hand, public policy in Argentina is bipolar, raucous and discontinuous. There is too much passion and too much unnecessary and futile extremism. Some years ago, a journalist asked Borges if he was affiliated with an Argentine political party. His answer: “I was once. I joined the conservative party because, in its insignificance, it was the only party incapable of stirring up excessive emotion.” The boutade of the great writer encapsulates an entire lesson on civic culture.
The value of soft power
In contrast, let’s reflect for a moment on the politics of development and regional relations in Brazil. Under the president’s leadership, but with a supporting network of social and economic consensus, Brazil has engaged its neighbors to the north and south in a “soft” politics of mutual agreement. It refuses to antagonize Venezuela and maintains cordial relations with the Bolivian regime. At the same time, Brazil’s alternative foreign and economic policy is making the country into, not merely a regional power, but a world power. Brazil has diversified its already strong industrial base and has projected itself into the global market. The recent discovery of huge oil reserves on the coastal shelf allows Brazil to free itself from dependence on foreign energy and, at the same time, fosters the export of primary and industrial products. Rather than antagonizing foreign investment, Brazil has promoted and stimulated further investment. It has been able to take advantage of the growing global demand for agricultural products and cane-derived ethanol, without falling into the trap of bitter distributive struggles and without making the mistake of promoting an inward-looking-type industrialization, called in Argentina, alter the rather modest national flower.(v)
The key to these intelligent policies lies in Lula’s soft style. At no time has he adopted intransigent or confrontational positions with his domestic opponents or neighboring countries. With this soft style of politics, Brazil outwardly shuns ambitions of continental hegemony while, at the same time, playing the role of Latin America’s silent leader and carrying a privileged voice in global forums. In this respect, Brazil follows the old recommendation of U.S. president Theodore Roosevelt: “Speak softly and carry a big stick,” which really means, “act firmly but without humbug.” The Argentine style, on the other hand, seems exactly the opposite. This is a time-honored distinction between Argentina and Brazil, in both internal and external policies. I will venture to say the following: If the Brazilian occupants of Itamaraty Palacevi and not the Argentine foreign /ministry (regardless of the civil or military status of the regime) had handled the 1982 conflict in the South Atlantic, the Malvinas/Falklands would have been incorporated as Argentine territory in a negotiated concession, without a shot being fired.
The soft style and the Internet
In our Internet era, the soft style represents the dominant paradigm. The key to this soft style lies in the word “net,” as in “network.” We live in an age of networks, and our society functions by virtue of so-called “network effects.” According to experts on the matter, including Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) professor Michael A. Cusumano and economist Michael Katz, a colleague of mine at New York University, we are in active transition between two distinct soft styles and two different types of network effects. In other words, we are moving from the hegemony of Microsoft and the iconic Bill Gates, who for years monopolized the operating platform of nearly all the world’s personal computers (which, in turn, generated a series of secondary network effects, i.e. computer-related businesses and activities), to the hegemony of the search engine Google, an extremely powerful business based not on a computer operating system but on the informational web which is the Internet.
Microsoft’s network effects are direct: The company’s ownership of operating formats obliges all users to work in the same code. On the other hand, Google’s network effects are indirect: It’s advantage is not based on any kind of technical monopoly but on the sheer numbers of free users, the capacity of these users to learn from one another, the prestige of the brand of search engine, and the users’ own inertia and comfort.
As can be seen, “power” in the modern world is rooted not in the imposition of an individual will or “model,” but on the increasingly intelligent collaboration between broad groups. “Power” is no longer vertical and top-down. It has become collective, free, shared, and horizontal.
Two ways of conducting politics
It is not hard to extrapolate from this example and apply it to the field of politics, where there are also two conceptions of the word “power.” These two conceptions are very old. In our civilization, they trace back to ancient Greece, but parallel developments can be found in other civilizations, such as China. For centuries, in Western countries power has been interpreted as the imposition of one will above all others. This is the classic definition of political power, from Machiavelli to Hobbes to Max Weber and Carl Schmitt. The other definition of power, or way of conducting politics, emphasized by philosopher Hannah Arendt, is the capacity to work together on a common project. This alternate conception is the philosophical source of the democratic idea. Today, technological evolution is moving us further from authoritarianism and its conception of vertical power and nearer to a horizontal, democratic form of power.
We are entering a new age of network democracy. By grace of the Internet, democratic participation has been written into the DNA of our culture. Every arbitrary imposition of “power” (in the old sense of the word) promises to be met with massive and spontaneous resistance, leaving behind those who attempt to govern with the old style of leadership.
An era of political surprises is dawning, ushered in by the wave of new technology. How else can we explain the swift replacement, in U.S. politics, of George W. Bush’s unilateral and overbearing authoritarianism with the cyber-mobilization behind Barak Obama’s candidacy? It bears mentioning that the media director of Senator Obama’s election campaign is the 24-year-old Chris Hughes, who from his dorm room at Harvard founded one of the Internet’s most innovative companies, the well-known Facebook.(vii) The social network has replaced the old district bosses of the traditional parties. I hope our politicians and officials take notice, because the surprises have just begun.
Notes:
(i) Jorge Simmel, Sociología, Madrid: 1939.
(iii) A distinguished political scientist reminded me recently that the current couple in power in Argentina is a product of the crisis of Peronism in 2003. The Kirchners slipped in through the back door, without the benefit of a dense social and political network rooted in the society. Once in office, with the power of the Executive and the resources gained from exports, they did build a network of disciplined loyalties inside the party. But it is within this network where cracks are now forming. It is also in this same network that a way out of the country’s political labyrinth may ultimately be found.
(vi)The Itamaraty Palace in Rio de Janeiro was the seat of the republican government from 1889 to 1898 and the seat of the Ministry of Foreign Relations from 1899 to 1970. The diplomats who worked there for seven decades became identified with the palace, and the name Itamaraty has become synonymous with the Brazilian ministry.
(vii)See Myspace.com and My.BarakObama.com
Translation: Remy Scalza
